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The paper contends that the ongoing controversy surrounding the creation of a contagious H5N1 
influenza virus has already exposed the severe limitations of the possibility of preventing the hostile 
misuse of the life sciences by dint of oversight of proposals and publications. It further argues that 
in order to prevent the potential wholesale militarisation of the life sciences, it is essential that life 
scientists become aware of their responsibilities within the context of the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention (BTWC) and actively contribute their expertise to strengthening the biological 
weapons non-proliferation regime .
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“…The	  race	  is	  on	  for	  scientists	  to	  Gind	  out	  as	  much	  as	  they	  can	  about	  H5N1	  and	  detect	  any	  
mutations	  that	  make	  it	  a	  human-­‐to-­‐human	  virus	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  At	  least	  then	  they	  will	  
know	  exactly	  what	  it	  is	  they	  are	  Gighting….	  In	  many	  ways,	  it	  [inGluenza	  virus]	  is	  the	  perfect	  
form	  of	  bio-­‐terrorism	  -­‐	  simple	  yet	  devastating.”
 Revill, J. (2005) Everything you need to know about Bird Flu and what you can do to 
 prepare for it. (page 27) Rodale, London.
Introduction
y April 2012 there have been 602 laboratory-confirmed cases of human infection with highly 
pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus [1]. 355 of these people died, but sustained human-
to-human transmission had not been demonstrated. Then in late 2011 it was reported that life 
scientists in The Netherlands and the United States had shown how the H5N1 virus could be made 
contagious through the air in mammals. This provoked a wide-ranging debate about whether, and 
how, the work should be published, or, indeed, whether it should have been carried out in the first 
place.
B
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Whilst that debate has, at the time of writing this paper, not yet finished, it is our contention that it 
has already exposed the severe limitations of the approach to the responsibilities of life scientists 
which has dominated discussions of the hostile misuse of the life sciences since 9/11 and the 
anthrax letter attacks in the United States. This approach, which is typified by the Fink Report [2] 
on Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism of 2004, suggests that as terrorists might misuse 
advanced life science research, such dual-use dangers can be prevented by restrictions (oversight) 
of project proposals and publications.
This paper begins by examination of the debate provoked by the attempt to publish the papers on 
contagious H5N1 and argues that there are good reasons why the bioterror/dual-use approach can 
only be relevant to a small part of the problem of containing the potential hostile misuse of the 
results of the ongoing revolution in the life sciences. That leads on to our suggestion that the real 
problem is that biotechnology, like other scientific and technological revolutions in the past, may, as 
pointed out by Professor Mathew Meselson [3] in 2000, be “intensively exploited, not only for 
peaceful purposes but also for hostile ones.” In short, bioterrorism and the exploitation of the results 
of advances in the life sciences by terrorists has to be seen in the wider framework of the potential 
wholesale militarization of the life sciences, and a much wider set of responsibilities than oversight 
of projects and publications is required of life scientists if their work is to be properly protected 
from misuse.
For this reason, the paper then briefly introduces the history of offensive State-level biological 
weapons programmes during the last century and the gradual development of the prohibition regime 
centred on the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). It is argued that life 
scientists’ responsibilities have to be seen within this wider framework and the ‘web of preventive 
policies’ centred on the BTWC, and that the issue of dual-use and bioterrorism is better understood 
as part of this wider framework.
This then leads on to an examination of the discussions amongst State Parties to the BTWC about 
awareness-raising and education of life scientists during this century. The paper ends with our own 
reflections on what needs to be covered in the education of life scientists for them to be able to 
actively engage in effectively protecting their benignly-intended work from misuse and an 
illustration of what might be done now to assist State Parties in their deliberations on the 
implications of advances in the life sciences through to the Eighth Five-Year Review Conference of 
the BTWC in 2016.
The Contagious Lethal H5N1 Debate
The committee chaired by Gerald Fink produced its report on Biotechnology Research in an Age of 
Terrorism in good part because of the increasing concerns about terrorism. As the report noted [4] 
“[B]iotechnolgy represents a ‘dual-use’ dilemma in which the same technologies can be used 
legitimately for human betterment and misused for terrorism”. Two points that are often forgotten 
are, first, that the committee viewed bioterrorism as only part of [5] “a wide spectrum of potentially 
dangerous activities” posed “by hostile individuals and nations”, and, secondly, that the committee’s 
first recommendation read as follows [6]:
“We	  recommend	  that	  national	  and	  international	  professional	  societies	  and	  related	  
organisations	  and	  institutions	  create	  programs	  to	  educate	  scientists	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	  dual-­‐use	  dilemma	  in	  biotechnology	  and	  their	  responsibilities	  to	  mitigate	  its	  risks.”
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We will return to both of these points later.
However, the Fink Committee is chiefly remembered for two quite different points. First, it 
suggested that there were at least seven classes of (mainly microbiological) research that were of 
sufficient concern to warrant oversight prior to being undertaken or published in full after being 
carried out. These experiments included those which [7]:
     “1. Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective…
2. Would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents…
3. Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a nonpathogen virulent…
4. Would increase the transmissibility of a pathogen…
5. Would alter the host range of a pathogen…
6. Would enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities…
7. Would enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin…"
The committee went on to note, directly after listing these categories, that “[O]ver time…it will be 
necessary to expand the experiments of concern to cover a significantly wider range of potential 
threats” and this point was fully endorsed by the subsequent Lemon-Relman Report [8] of the US 
National Academies.
Secondly, the Fink Committee recommended the setting up of a national committee to [9] “provide 
advice, guidance, and leadership for the system of review and oversight we are proposing”. This in 
turn led to the establishment of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) 
which has actively endeavoured to fulfil this remit. One of the Board’s first endeavours, in 2005, 
concerned the publication of the sequencing and synthesis of deadly Spanish Influenza virus. They 
approved publication, but it should be noted that the then editor of Science is on record [10] as 
stating “So would I…have published the paper even if the NSABB have voted otherwise? 
Absolutely…”
So it is against that background of widespread ignorance of, and opposition to, biosecurity 
considerations that current concerns about H5N1 have to be understood. And this is so even though 
in the years after 9/11 editors of leading science journal agreed to institute a biosecurity review of 
publications of concern [11], grant giving organisations began to ask applicants if they had taken 
biosecurity issues into account [12], the InterAcademy Panel published the principles of a code of 
conduct related to biosecurity [13], and The Netherlands Academy of Science published a specific 
biosecurity code of conduct [14]. Moreover, The Netherlands code had the text of the BTWC as its 
first appendix, and the lead scientist in the Dutch study on H5N1 was part of the group that 
produced the code.
Of course, it is not possible at this stage to give a full account of what happened in these H5N1 
projects and attempted publications, but certain facts are already known and allow for some 
conclusions to be drawn as to the utility of the oversight system. The two studies first became 
widely known when an article appeared in Science in November 2011 [15]. From this article it was 
clear that both projects, at the Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and at the 
University of Wisconsin, Madison had been funded and approved for publication by the US 
National Institutes of Health before they were submitted to Science (and Nature) when the NSABB 
became involved. The Guardian quoted Paul Keim, chair of NSABB, as stating [16] “[I]f this virus 
were to escape by error or terror, we must ask whether it would cause a pandemic” and adding that:
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“The	  probability	  is	  unknown,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  zero.	  There	  are	  many	  scenarios	  to	  consider,	  
ranging	  from	  mad	  lone	  scientists,	  desperate	  despots	  and	  members	  of	  millennial	  doomsday	  
cults,	  to	  nation	  states	  wanting	  mutually	  assured	  destruction	  options,	  bioterrorists	  or	  a	  
single	  person’s	  random	  acts	  of	  craziness.”
According to the deputy editor of Science about 1, 000 scientists were already familiar with the 
details of the Dutch study [17]. This revelation is curious, not least because the Netherlands group 
seems to have deviated from the national Code of Conduct on Biosecurity and its provisions on 
‘Research and Publication Policy’, according to which scientists should [18]: “Screen for possible 
dual-use aspects during the application and assessment procedure and during the execution of 
research projects.”
Still, it can reasonably be argued that there has been a degree of ‘over-hype’ in regard to the 
capabilities of terrorists to replicate papers that report the results of cutting-edge research. For 
example, one of the original experiments that caused concern early in this century was the chemical 
synthesis of the polio virus [19]. However, on closer examination it was found that crucial tacit 
knowledge, which would not have been available from the published paper, was required to 
replicate the synthesis [20]. The team at the University of Wisconsin-Madison [21]:
“…created	  a	  chimeric	  virus	  with	  the	  haemagglutinin	  protein	  from	  H5N1	  and	  the	  genes	  
from	  the	  2009	  pandemic	  strain	  of	  H1N1.	  It	  was	  an	  artiGicial	  version	  of	  the	  same	  process	  
though	  which	  wild	  viruses	  shufGle	  their	  genes,	  known	  as	  reassortment…”
The mutant virus spread easily among ferrets, but did not retain its virulence. The work in The 
Netherlands caused more concern. The virus genome was first altered so that the mutant strain 
could easily attach to mammalian nose and tracheal cells. However, the virus could not spread 
between individuals through the air. To overcome the deficiency, the researchers then exposed 
ferrets to the strain and used nasal fluids from the already sickened animals to infect others:
“…After	  10	  rounds,	  the	  virus	  could	  spread	  through	  the	  air	  to	  infect	  ferrets	  in	  neighbouring	  
cages.	  The	  genome	  of	  the	  airborne	  strain	  differed	  from	  the	  original	  one	  by	  just	  Give	  
mutations…”
Moreover when this new mutant virus was implanted physically into the trachea or nasal passages 
of ferrets, the animals died. Ferrets are the surrogate organisms for such work on mammals and the 
use of passage through a series of animals is well known as a standard method of increasing the 
virulence of a pathogen. According to Michael Imperiale, a professor of microbiology and member 
of the NSABB, the technology of making influenza viruses from DNA clones is widely available 
and “while not simple, is not beyond someone with basic knowledge of molecular and cell culture 
techniques” [22]. This in turn implies that tacit knowledge requirements are unlikely to be as high if 
an attempt were made to replicate that part of the work. Moreover, the reason that so many people 
were thought to have knowledge of the Netherlands work was because it was presented at an 
international conference on Influenza research in Malta prior to being submitted for publication 
[23].
Throughout the period of dominance of the dual-use/bioterrorism framework of understanding the 
threat it has been suggested that oversight of projects and publications should be based on an 
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assessment of the risks as against the benefits of a research project or publication. Hence the 
researchers who carried out these H5N1 studies have argued that their work could help in detecting 
the occurrence of a dangerous new virus, like the ones they created, in nature, and in the 
development of vaccines against such a new virus. Some scientists, however, have dismissed such 
claims as ‘hollow’ emphasising that the “risk/benefit ratio is essentially infinite – high risk relative 
to zero or near-zero benefit” [24], As an editorial in Nature has underscored [25]:
“In	  practice,	  the	  immediate	  beneGits	  are	  minimal.	  Surveillance	  of	  inGluenza	  in	  animals	  is	  
slow	  and	  patchy	  at	  best,	  and	  follow-­‐up	  sequencing	  of	  samples	  more	  so.	  And	  the	  mutations	  
that	  we	  know	  about	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  outnumbered	  by	  those	  about	  which	  we	  are	  still	  
ignorant…”
And, further, that:
"…Current	  techniques	  can	  produce	  vaccines	  only	  six	  months	  after	  a	  pandemic	  emerges.	  
Doing	  so	  faster	  and	  in	  much	  larger	  quantities	  is	  the	  most	  urgent	  public-­‐health	  priority	  
when	  it	  comes	  to	  planning	  for	  the	  next	  pandemic.
The	  mutant-­‐Glu	  studies	  contribute	  little	  to	  this	  goal…"
The calling into question of whether the H5N1 research has any benefits to society is more serious, 
perhaps, than many realise because the BTWC clearly bans work that has no justification for 
peaceful purposes. Article I of the Convention states that [26]:
"Each	  State	  Party	  to	  this	  Convention	  undertakes	  never	  in	  any	  circumstances	  to	  develop,	  
produce,	  stockpile	  or	  otherwise	  acquire	  or	  retain:
1.	  Microbial	  or	  other	  agents,	  or	  toxins	  whatever	  their	  origin	  or	  method	  of	  production,	  of	  
types	  and	  in	  quantities	  that	  have	  no	  justiGication	  for	  prophylactic,	  protective	  or	  other	  
peaceful	  purposes…"
Now it may be objected that the Convention does not prohibit research, but that is to ignore what 
State Parties have agreed at each Review Conference in regard to Article I since 1991. As the Final 
Document of the Seventh Review Conference of the BTWC in December 2011 stated [27]:
“The	  Conference	  notes	  that	  experimentation	  involving	  open	  air	  release	  of	  pathogens	  or	  
toxins	  harmful	  to	  humans,	  animals	  and	  plants	  that	  have	  no	  justiGication	  for	  prophylactic,	  
protective	  or	  other	  peaceful	  purposes	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  undertakings	  contained	  in	  
Article	  I.”
There certainly cannot be any doubt that some of these H5N1 experiments involved demonstrating 
that the deadly virus was contagious through the open air from infected ferrets to uninfected ferrets. 
The Netherlands group made it clear that this was their objective when they pointed out that [28] 
“[O]ur research program aimed to test whether A/H5N1 virus could acquire the ability to spread in 
aerosols in mammals, following similar genetic changes as those identified in previous pandemic 
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viruses…” Likewise, the primary goals of the US team were to “evaluate the pandemic potential of 
H5N1 viruses” and “identify the molecular features required for adaptation of avian H5N1 viruses 
in humans”[29].
It could, of course, be objected that what State Parties referred to in their common understanding 
was large scale open-air tests. However, as making an influenza virus contagious through the air is 
effectively to weaponise it there must be reservation about such an objection. Furthermore, Article 
III of the BTWC states that [30]:
“Each	  State	  Party	  to	  this	  Convention	  undertakes	  not	  to	  transfer	  to	  any	  recipient	  
whatsoever,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  and	  not	  in	  any	  way	  to	  assist,	  encourage,	  or	  induce	  any	  
State,	  group	  of	  States	  or	  international	  organisations	  to	  manufacture	  or	  otherwise	  acquire	  
any	  of	  the	  agents,	  toxins,	  weapons,	  equipment	  or	  means	  of	  delivery	  speciGied	  in	  Article	  I	  of	  
the	  Convention.”	  (emphasis	  added)
So it has to be asked whether publication of the H5N1 studies would assist those with hostile intent 
in the acquisition of what is banned by Article I.
After careful deliberation and several hundreds of hours of discussion in late 2011 the NSABB 
reached the conclusion that these papers could not be published in full because of the risks of 
subsequent misuse. As one of the Board members commented on the recommendation, “We don’t 
want to give bad guys a road map on how to make bad bugs really bad” [31]. However, this 
decision was then discussed by 21 influenza experts and one ethicist at an international meeting at 
the World Health Organisation (WHO) and that meeting had reservations about what the NSABB 
had decided [32]. So upon a request by the NIH the NSABB again considered the issue at another 
meeting that was addressed by the senior scientists of the two groups. Following an intensive two-
day discussion the members of NSABB decided that the papers should be published in full. A 
crucial factor for this decision was the new policy for oversight of dual-use research of concern 
[33], which the US Government issued on the first day of the NSABB meeting and which allowed 
classification of scientific work on security grounds. So, in the absence of appropriate mechanisms 
for disseminating research findings on a need-to-know basis, the Board was left with the option of 
either stopping or allowing publication, and in such circumstances they opted for the latter. One 
member of the Board was quoted as saying [34]:
“…the	  group	  would	  likely	  have	  still	  recommended	  that	  the	  studies	  be	  redacted	  -­‐	  published	  
in	  abbreviated	  form	  -­‐	  but	  the	  NSABB,	  as	  others,	  have	  concluded	  that	  the	  option	  is	  
unworkable.”
Even then, however, some members had deep concerns. The eighteen voting members of the Board 
were unanimously in favour of publication of the work carried out in the USA, but six voted against  
publication of the work done in The Netherlands. Similarly, the Dutch Government discussed 
whether the results of the work carried out there had created knowledge that might be too dangerous 
to export but eventually agreed to publication [35]. Meanwhile, one of the NSABB members 
recently voiced concerns about the way in which the second Board meeting (29–30 March 2012) 
had been organised. In a letter addressed to a senior NIH official, Professor Michael Osterholm 
stated that the meeting “was designed to produce the outcome that occurred” representing a very 
“one sided” picture of the risk-benefit of communicating the research results openly [36]. 
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Specifically, he emphasises that “the Board received no formal or informal presentation from those 
on the front lines of H5N1 animal surveillance” and that the security briefing at which the risks of 
malevolent applications of the mutation data were discussed was “incomplete” and even 
“useless” [37].
Even though all of the NSABB deliberations took part behind ‘closed doors’ and were never given 
detailed media coverage, several Board members have commented on why they were opposed to 
the publication of the studies, especially the one conducted in the Netherlands. In their view, the 
main reason why the projects were problematic was that they fell into both the fourth and the fifth 
categories of research of concern listed by the Fink Committee. That is experiments that [38]:
“Would	  increase	  transmissibility	  of	  a	  pathogen…	  ”
“Would	  alter	  the	  host	  range	  of	  a	  pathogen…”
In addition, it can be argued that making deadly H5N1 influenza contagious would also come under 
the seventh of Fink’s categories. That is an experiment that “[W]ould enable the weaponisation of a 
biological agent or toxin”. This follows because Article I.2 of the BTWC states [39] that the 
prohibition covers “[W]eapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or 
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict”, whereby contagion though the air is clearly a 
means of delivery.
The reported views of knowledgeable members of the NSABB in the period after the WHO meeting 
and before the second decision of the NSABB are instructive in trying to understand why even in 
the constrained situation of the second meeting some people still voted against publication of the 
work of the group from The Netherlands. David Relman and Stanley Lemon co-chaired the follow-
up report to that of Fink [40]. Relman was reported to have said [41]:
“My	  bottom	  line:	  Fouchier	  started	  with	  a	  highly	  worrisome	  and	  sometimes	  lethal	  virus	  to	  
humans	  and	  appears	  to	  have	  enhanced	  its	  transmissibility	  by	  the	  respiratory	  route.	  
Nothing	  said	  in	  recent	  days	  changes	  these	  facts…”
And Lemon said bluntly [42]:
“The	  major	  concern	  has	  been	  about	  acquisition	  of	  the	  capability	  for	  aerosol	  transmission	  of	  
the	  virus	  to	  a	  mammal.”
Now people who have looked at such experiments of concern in detail [43,44], state that it will 
frequently be possible for an oversight system to suggest modifications at the project proposal stage 
that can avoid these kinds of difficulty later.
It is, however, difficult to see how Fouchier’s experiment could have been so modified because of 
its stated objectives. It has to be reiterated that Fouchier has been open about the objective of the 
work throughout the recent public debate [45]:
“Our	  research	  program	  on	  H5N1	  virus	  transmission,	  which	  led	  to	  submission	  of	  one	  of	  the	  
papers	  that	  has	  stirred	  up	  so	  much	  recent	  controversy,	  aimed	  to	  investigate	  whether	  and	  
how	  HPAI	  [Highly	  Pathogenic	  Avian	  InGluenza]	  H5N1	  virus	  can	  acquire	  the	  ability	  to	  be	  
transmitted	  via	  aerosols	  among	  mammals	  and	  whether	  it	  would	  retain	  its	  virulence…”
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Given the shambles amongst the scientific community it is hardly surprising that politicians have 
begun to step in on behalf of the wider society.
A senior US Congressman summarised the present disarray amongst life scientists with a series of 
questions to the White House science advisor. These questions well illustrate how little life 
scientists have been able to accomplish in protecting their work from hostile misuse over the last 10 
years. The Congressman’s questions were [46]:
      “1.How does NSABB weigh the potential risks and benefits of dual-use research? When does it   
 advocate against publication?
2. What systems exist to identify and, if necessary, control early stage dual-use research?
3. ….What is the government’s current system for disseminating legitimate dual-use research 
worldwide? How is that system being implemented with respect to the articles in question?
4. Is the NIH’s review system adequate to identify potentially dangerous dual-use research? 
Why did it fail to identify the avian flu research until it was completed and submitted for 
publication?”
These are very difficult questions and might lead to the conclusion that oversight really is 
unworkable. If that position is accepted, then there is little need for dual-use/biosecurity education 
of life scientists because either everything that can be done is allowed, or politicians will decide 
what can be done. This particular example of the creation of a contagious lethal H5N1 virus, and 
the difficulty of agreeing what should be done about it, should certainly give everyone pause for 
thought. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that the team in the Netherlands has already “identified an 
addition mutation that results in ferret-to-ferret transmission without the need for repeated passage 
of the virus in ferrets” [47]. However, we think oversight still has a role to play both in lessening 
difficulties by allowing modification of individual projects, but more fundamentally, in laying the 
foundations for a much wider understanding of the risks and the resultant responsibilities of life 
scientists. Above all, for research oversight to be effective, the life science community as a whole 
needs to be sensitised to the dangers posed by the potential misuse of life science knowledge and to 
how those can be mitigated. It is to such wider understanding, awareness-raising and education that 
should come out of the avian influenza debate that we now turn.
The Wider Responsibilities of Life Scientists
In contrast to the narrow view of the potential dangers enclosed in the dual-use/bioterrorism 
framework, for over two decades there has been a well-articulated view that what is needed to 
prevent the militarisation of the modern life sciences is an integrated “web of preventive policies” 
that will persuade anyone thinking of going down that path that the costs will far outweigh the 
benefits [48]. Furthermore, given that there were a series of offensive biological weapons 
programmes by major States in the last century [49, 50] it has to be understood that these policies 
have to be centred on the 1975 BTWC. The web of policies would, for example, include:
• Effective intelligence; -Co-ordinated export controls;
• As strong as possible BTWC implemented in-depth nationally;
• Sensible biodefence against validated threats; and
• A clear international determination to respond vigorously to any violation of the norm embodied 
in the prohibition regime.
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What is of interest here is the State Parties’ understanding of in-depth implementation of the BTWC 
nationally.
Article IV of the BTWC requires that State Parties take measures to prohibit and prevent what is 
banned in Article I, and the meaning of ‘prevent’ clearly involves life scientists. At the Second 
Review Conference of the BTWC in 1986 State Parties agreed, in relation to Article IV, that [51]:
“The	  Conference	  notes	  the	  importance	  of:	  -­‐	  inclusion	  in	  textbooks	  and	  in	  medical,	  scientiGic	  
and	  military	  educational	  programmes	  of	  information	  dealing	  with	  the	  prohibition	  of	  
microbial	  or	  other	  biological	  agents	  or	  toxins	  and	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol	  [of	  
1925].”
And similar statements have been repeated at subsequent Review Conferences. So there is no doubt 
that an aware and educated life science community worldwide is essential for the strength of the 
prohibition regime. Clearly, there is much that such an educated and engaged community could 
contribute to preventing the hostile misuse of their work. For example, Synthetic Biologists have 
investigated measures that could help to ensure that those with hostile intent cannot easily order 
dangerous material from commercial companies [52].
However, it is also abundantly clear that most practicing life scientists have little or no 
understanding of the Convention, or of their responsibilities under the Convention. As a major 
Working Paper by 12 State Parties, including the USA and the UK, for the Seventh Review 
Conference states [53]:
“Life	  scientists	  do	  not	  often	  consciously	  consider	  the	  possibility	  that	  their	  work	  could	  be	  of	  
relevance	  to	  a	  biological	  weapons	  programme	  or	  other	  wise	  misused	  to	  cause	  harm	  to	  
people,	  animals	  or	  plants	  or	  to	  render	  critical	  resources	  unusable…”
Unsurprisingly, therefore, State Parties considered what might be done to raise the awareness and 
education of life scientists in their annual meetings in 2005 and 2008 so that scientists could 
become better engaged, for example, in the development of codes of conduct and oversight systems.
Indeed, in 2008 State Parties agreed on the value of a series of educational measures that would 
include [54]:
“(i) Explaining the risks associated with the potential misuse of the biological sciences and 
biotechnology;
(ii) Covering the moral and ethical obligations incumbent on those using the biological 
sciences;
(iii) Providing guidance on the types of activities which could be contrary to the aims of the 
Convention and relevant national laws and regulations and international law;
(iv) Being supported by accessible teaching materials, train-the-trainer programmes, 
seminars, workshops, publications, audio-visual materials…”
In their 2011 Working Paper the 12 State Parties detailed what they had done in order to carry out 
such awareness-raising and educational activities [55]. Additionally, non-governmental 
organisations have reported their efforts to develop and make available relevant teaching materials, 
train-the-trainer programmes, and seminars and workshops [56]. Yet it is obvious that a great deal 
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more will have to be done in order to elaborate and implement comprehensive national strategies on 
education in biosecurity so that life scientists will be in a position to contribute their expertise to 
preventing the future militarisation of the life sciences.
In that context, it is hardly surprising that State Parties to the BTWC at the Seventh Review 
Conference agreed to have a Standing Agenda Item (SAI) for their meetings through to the next 
review on "Review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the 
Convention”, and that two of the sub-items under this SAI would be [57]:
"(d) voluntary codes of conduct and other measures to encourage responsible conduct by 
scientists, academia and industry.
[and]
(e) education and awareness-raising about risks and benefits of life sciences and 
biotechnology."
Unfortunately, what is also evident is that, given the limited time available for the annual meetings 
at Expert and State Party levels, and the very crowded agenda, it is unlikely that State Parties will 
be able to make substantive and cumulative progress on these sub-topics before the Eighth Review 
Conference without considerable help from the scientific community in providing input to the 
meetings, and analyses of the outcomes, in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015.
Our view is that a comprehensive strategy on awareness-raising and education will have to be 
developed by each State Party and its implementation carefully monitored if significant progress is 
to be ensured [58]. However, if progress is well reported to the annual meetings of the BTWC, there 
is a hope that a rapid evolution of best practices will be possible. In that regard, our own experience 
strongly suggests that educational programmes need to begin by adding the issues of biosecurity 
and dual-use to the range of topics, such as plagiarism and fraud that scientist are increasingly made 
aware of and cautioned about in courses on the responsible conduct of research [59]. But we also 
consider that this basic awareness-raising has to be supplemented, whatever the problems of 
teaching such material to scientists [60], with some straightforward material on how philosophers 
deal with ethical questions [61]. It should then be possible for scientists to think more clearly about 
their responsibilities in relation to experiments that raise dual-use concerns. We have certainly 
found that scientists who have become aware of the potential dangers are very serious about their 
responsibilities in protecting the results of their work from misuse [62]. Nevertheless, as the H5N1 
experiments of concern discussed here have demonstrated all too clearly, responsibility cannot be 
discharged solely at the level of the individual scientist’s projects and publications. It is necessary 
that a wider framework of understanding is developed so that dual-use and bioterrorism are seen as 
only part of a much wider problem of protecting the life sciences from large scale militarisation. 
Then the much wider range of actions that can be taken will become available to the life science 
community as a whole. Of course, it is noteworthy that the challenge of dual-use is not unique to 
the life science, but arises in other fields of study, such as chemistry, as it has already been 
demonstrated [63].
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